The Equal Application Defense: The Equal Application Defense by Williams, Jeffrey A.
THE EQUAL APPLICATION DEFENSE: THE EQUAL
APPLICATION DEFENSE
Jeffrey A. Williams*
The Opening and the Close
Of Being, are alike
Or differ, if they do,
As Bloom upon a Stalk.
That from an equal Seed
Unto an equal Bud
Go parallel, perfected
In that they have decayed.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Once again, the nation finds itself embroiled in a radical redefini-
tion of marriage and, once again, it finds the resurfacing of a reac-
tionary rationalization for social mores and the legal defenses
thereof. This is what the equal application defense was-past tense-
and this is what the equal application defense is seeking to become
again.
Succincdy, the equal application defense maintains that a statute's
reliance on any particular classification system is not constitutionally
problematic if the statute applies equally to both (or maybe all2)
member classes within the system. Laws prohibiting interracial co-
habitation and marriage, since held unconstitutional, were said by
their proponents not to be discriminatory because they were applied
to whites and blacks alike. Likewise, laws prohibiting same-sex mar-
riage are said not to be discriminatory because they are applied to
men and women alike. There is no difference between these argu-
ments, as far as these arguments can comprehend.3
B.A. in History & Religion, Columbia University, 2002, J.D.; Columbia Law School, 2005.
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, New York, NY, 2005-2006. Jeffrey passed away prior to
the publication of this article. He wished to extend special thanks "to the constancy of Profes-
sors Franke, Thomas, Henkin, and Dubler, as well as to the support of Gene, Greg, Christine,
Christine, Steven, Bob, and David." He also dedicated this article to his brother "for showing
me the good where I found only the critical."
EMILY DICKINSON, The Opening and the Close, in THE COMPLETE POEMS OF EMILY DICKINSON
1047 (Thomas H. Johnson ed., Time Warner Book Group 1960).
2 See infra text accompanying notes 37-41.
3 A word here about analogy. The more common discussion of these arguments comes in
conservative critiques of the so-called "Loving analogy," which contend that connections be-
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This, then, is the equal application defense to the equal applica-
tion defense. If the defense is to be applied, it must be applied to all
alike. If it is to be-as it has, in fact, been-repudiated, it must be
repudiated for all the same. If it is valid, laws prohibiting miscegena-
tion are not unconstitutional. If it is invalid, laws prohibiting same-
sex marriage are likely unconstitutional: marriage traditionalists
must either formulate a different response to claims of sex discrimi-
nation or defend the exclusion of same-sex couples under the inter-
mediate standard of scrutiny afforded sex classifications.4
Contemporary proponents of the equal application defense mis-
understand the import of facial classification and misapprehend the
depths of sexism in American history and society. Worse, the defense
either flatly ignores or grossly misreads Supreme Court precedent: it
is simply not good law. Part II of this Article details the extension
and rejection of the equal application defense in its original context
and then examines the revitalization of the equal application defense
in two sexual contexts. The truth is that McLaughlin v. Florida5 and
Loving v. Virginia6 necessarily altered the defense: its initial incarna-
tion stated simply that a law is constitutional so long as it applies
equally to the groups involved, whereas its reincarnation urges that
equal application demarcates facial neutrality and therefore only a
discriminatory purpose will subject the law at issue to constitutional
tween miscegenation and same-sex marriage are tenuous. See David Orgon Coolidge, Playing the
Loving Card: Same-Sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYUJ. PUB. L. 201, 201 (1998)
("The use of Loving in our time is preeminently a political use. In the debate over the definition
of marriage, Loving is the wedge, the theme piece, the call to arms. One might call Loving 'the
race card' of the marriage debate. Advocates are 'playing the Loving card.'"); id. at 204 ("I con-
clude 'the Loving analogy' has been of vital political utility to the advocates of same-sex marriage
precisely because it is more about politics than law."); Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Con-
stitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. 1, 75-88 (1996) (critiquing the anal-
ogy); Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-Sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a Retreat from Mar-
riage by Redefining Marriage, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 735, 752 (1998) ("[H]omosexual behavior is not
comparable to race as a basis for marriage regulations.").
This Article is more about law than politics, most specifically the conclusion in McLaughlin v.
lorida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964), and again in Loving that the statutes contained racial classifica-
tions. This determination-of a point of law, by precedents of an authoritative court-is not
merely an analogy. So it is all well and good to assert social or political differences between the
miscegenation and same-sex marriage debates. The problem is the assertion that these differ-
ences undermine the claim of discrimination, an assertion quite clearly incorporated into most
critiques of the so-called Loving analogy. Coolidge and his colleagues raise intelligible points
regarding the political uses of the analogy but the issues of constitutional structure, facial classi-
fication, and discriminatory purposes are subjects of precedent, policy, and theory; to term
these matters of analogy is, at the least, misleading, if not pejorative.
4 See discussion infra note 70.
5 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (involving a statute that prohibited an interracial, unmarried couple
from habitating in the same room at night).
6 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (invalidating miscegenation laws).
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scrutiny.7 Part III then engages three critiques of this revitalized
equal application defense. The first, the strong defense, maintains
very directly that there is no legally articulable reason why the de-
fense would apply any more or less depending on the classification or
scrutiny involved. Part III continues to consider first the claim that
no facial sex classification is involved in same-sex marriage regula-
tions and then the claim that there is no sexist purpose behind them.
The goal is a limited but direct one: between these three critiques,
the equal application defense must be understood as no defense at
all. s
II. AMERICA NEVER WAS AMERICA TO ME:" THE BIRTH, DEATH, AND
RESURRECTION OF THE EQUAL APPLICATION DEFENSE
The purpose of this Section is merely to examine closely the invo-
cation of the equal application defense in the contexts of miscegena-
tion and same-sex marriage. There are differences between these is-
sues-significant issues regarding class and personal expressiveness-
but the invocation of the defense reads nearly the same.
A. Pace Meets the Warren Court
The birth of the equal application defense came in Pace v. Ala-
bama,'° addressing the constitutionality of a state statute that pre-
scribed a more severe penalty for adultery or fornication when com-
mitted between "any white person and any negro."" These penalties
were levied against both offenders, however, and thus the statute
purportedly made no distinction between the two classes committing
the offense. The Supreme Court clung resolutely to this facet of the
statute, asserting the mistake of comparing the basic adultery statute
and its interracial analog.12 Thus sprang forth the defense: "What-
ever discrimination is made in the punishment prescribed in the two
sections is directed against the offence designated and not against the
7 As I endeavor to show in Part 1II.B, this distinction stems from an understandable but
nonetheless unmistakable error. In short preview, this distinction stems from a misreading of
Loving and an overlooking of McLaughlin.
8 Again, this conclusion is merely that the sex discrimination argument demands more le-
gal attention than a putative rejection of the existence of sex classifications, facial or otherwise.
9 LANGSTON HUGHES, Let America Be America Again, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF LANGSTON
HUGHES 189 (Arnold Rampersad ed., 1994) ("Let America be America again. / Let it be the
dream it used to be. / Let it be the pioneer on the plain / Seeking a home where he himself is
free. / (America never was America to me.)").
10 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
1 Id. at 583. In a preview of later anti-miscegenation statutes, Alabama's section 4189 was
actually not quite so simple, also attaching the harsher penalty to adultery and fornication be-
tween a white and a "descendant of any negro to the third generation, inclusive, though one
ancestor of each generation was a white person ...." Id.
12 Id. at 584 (opinion of Field,J.).
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person of any particular color or race. The punishment of each of-
fending person, whether white or black, is the same." 13
It is the second statement, naked, which resounds in the case law
on interracial sexual relations; the first is a different staple of the con-
servative constitutional diet.14 So pervasive is this argument in misce-
genation challenges that it even surfaces in Frasher v. State, which ad-
dressed a statute that 'affixe[d] a penalty upon the white person
alone, and none upon the negro."'15 Others were more direct in their
allegiance. In Green v. State, for instance, the court declared the law
"no more tolerates [interracial marriage] in one of the parties than
the other-in a white person than in a negro or mulatto; and each of
them is punishable for the offense prohibited, in precisely the same
manner and to the same extent."'
16
This reasoning endured for decades until the Warren Court de-
clared it "a limited view of the Equal Protection Clause."'7 Even be-
fore McLaughlin and Loving reached the Supreme Court, the facade
was crumbling. The Supreme Court of California had rejected an
anti-miscegenation statute in the 1948 case of Perez v. Lippold.1 Rely-
ing on the importance of marriage, Perez distinguished Pace as merely
an adultery and fornication statute 19 and looked to the growing con-
cern with racial classifications. Korematsu's subjection of such classifi-
cations to "the most rigid scrutiny 20 loomed large, as did Hirabaya-
13 Id. at 585 (holding there was no violation of equal protection).
14 The relationship between these statements may be clear. Granted, the second is evidence
of the first. Yet it would be more difficult to suggest that the first helps prove the second.
Where it is repeated, the argument presented by the second is not wedded to the first and thus
it is the second proposition alone that bears the brunt of the foregoing analysis. See, e.g.,Janet
E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gays, Lesbians and Bisexual Identity,
36 UCLA L. REV. 915, 956-57 (1989) (discussing presumptions about homosexual identity and
behavior); Francisco Valdes, Sexual Minorities in the Military: Charting the Constitutional Frontiers of
Status and Conduct, 27 CREIGHTON L. REv. 384, 387-89 (1994) (discussing the distinction be-
tween status and conduct).
15 3 Tex. Ct. App. 263, 276-77 (1877) (reasoning that, because defendants concede an
equally applying statute would be constitutional, it follows that the State can regulate interracial
marriage in the most effective manner it chooses). Frasher, therefore, is not truly an application
of the defense. Yet Frasher raises a valid query: if it is it valid for the legislature to punish all,
what renders a State's selective benevolence unconstitutional?
16 58 Ala. 190, 192 (1877).
17 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964) (rejecting Pace as controlling authority).
18 198 P.2d 17, 34 (Cal. 1948) (stating that the statute violated the foundations on which the
country was built).
See id., 198 P.2d at 26 (Traynor, J.) ("We are not required by the facts of this case to dis-
cuss the reasoning of Pace v. Alabama except to state that adultery and non-marital intercourse
are not, like marriage, a basic right, but are offenses subject to various degrees of punish-
ment.").
20 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted, to begin with,
that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to say that courts
must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify
the existence of such restrictions; racial antagonism never can.").
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shi's proclamation that distinctions based on ancestry are "by their
very nature odious to a free people.,'2 Perez rejected the anti-
miscegenation law under several theories2 2 and over an equally insis-
tent dissent by Judge Shenk that found "an unbroken line of judicial
23support" for anti-miscegenation laws. First and foremost in this un-
broken line was Pace.
Yet the prescient Perez decision had anticipated the break nearly
two decades before McLaughlin reached the U.S. Supreme Court.
Perhaps Loving gets more attention than McLaughlin because it ad-
dressed marriage instead of the criminalization of "a white person
and a Negro who habitually occupy the same room at nighttime.2 4
Perhaps it is because of Loving's still singular accusation of "White
Supremacy'', 2or just the incredible cach6 of a case literally pitting
Loving against Virginia. But in any case, it was McLaughlin that de-
_26nied the authority in Pace;, McLaughlin that declared Pace "a limited
view of the Equal Protection Clause which has not withstood analysis
in the subsequent decisions of this Court";7 and McLaughlin that
urged that "U]udicial inquiry under the Equal Protection
Clause ... does not end with a showing of equal application among
the members of the class defined by the legislation.28  It was
McLaughlin, not Loving, that decided that the question of "invidious
discrimination" is "what Pace ignored and what must be faced here.2 9
In plain, simple language, the Court declared, "[W] e deal here with a
classification based upon ... race . . .."3
Loving merely followed suit, however resoundingly. Loving per-
ceived "the doctrine of White Supremacy" as undergirding both Vir-
21 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
2 Perez was a fascinating melange of constitutional arguments. It came in the specific con-
text of two Catholics asserting that the prohibition violated their free exercise of religion to par-
ticipate in the sacrament of marriage. See Perez, 198 P.2d at 18. The court also considered
claims under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, id. at 19, and Equal Protection
Clause, id. at 20.
23 Id. at 198 P.2d at 39-41 (Shenk, J., dissenting).
24 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 186 (1964).
25 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7, 11 (1967).
26 See McLaughlin, 379 U.S. at 188 (abrogating Pace).
27 Id.
28 Id. at 191.
29 Id.
Id. I note this simple statement because of its significance later. To be clear on the
groundwork for that application, this statement cannot be sensibly read as an attribution of a
discriminatory purpose within a facially neutral statute. Only once does the McLaughlin Court
suggest anything even remotely akin to an investigation of discriminatory purpose, when it de-
clares the issue of invidious discrimination "what Pace ignored and what must be faced here."
Id. The best reading of this is that the McLaughlin Court saw invidious racial discrimination
wherever there was a facial classification, not that the statute was facially neutral but exhibited a
non-facial discriminatory purpose. Numerous references to racial classification belie this im-
pression, as does McLaughlin's remarkable revision of Pace as holding, sub silentio, that the Ala-
bama miscegenation law was discriminatory but possessed a legitimate purpose. Id. at 190.
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ginia's statute3 1 and the Virginia case of Naim v. Naim on which the
State had relied.32  Judge Bazile's infamous remarks about God's ra-
33 34cial intentions3 and the Court's blistering response are only of sec-
ondary importance here. More significant in the Court's opinion was
its resolute denial of the equal application defense:
Because we reject the notion that the mere "equal application" of a stat-
ute containing racial classifications is enough to remove the classifica-
tions from the Fourteenth Amendment's proscription of all invidious ra-
cial discriminations, we do not accept the State's contention that these
statutes should be upheld if there is any possible basis for concluding that
they serve a rational purpose. The mere fact of equal application does
not mean that our analysis of these statutes should follow the approach
we have taken in cases involving no racial discrimination .... In these
cases, involving distinctions not drawn according to race, the Court has
merely asked whether there is any rational foundation for the discrimina-
tions, and has deferred to the wisdom of the state legislatures. In the
case at bar, however, we deal with statutes containing racial classifica-
tions, and the fact of equal application does not immunize the statute
from the very heavy burden of justification which the Fourteenth
Amendment has traditionally required of state statutes drawn according
35
to race.
This lengthy passage includes, repeatedly, an essential point. Not
once does the Court suggest an examination of a discriminatory pur-
pose because the statute is facially neutral. To the contrary, the
Court notes, repeatedly, that the racial classification persists despite its
equal application. Loving is a strident rejection of discriminatory
purposes, but that vehemence followed an insistent articulation of
the racial classifications used on the face of the statute. One might
think this much would be unmistakable.
31 See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-57 (1960) (voiding interracial marriages); id. § 20-54 (defining
interracial marriage).
32 Compare Naim v. Naim, 87 S.E.2d 749, 756 (Va. 1955) (holding that the Constitution con-
tains no provisions "which prohibit the State from enacting legislation to preserve the racial
integrity of its citizens, or which den [y] the power of the State to regulate the marriage relation
so that it shall not have a mongrel breed of citizens. We find there no requirement that the
State shall not legislate to prevent the obliteration of racial pride, but must permit the corrup-
tion of blood even though it weaken or destroy the quality of its citizenship"), with Loving v.
Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (calling Naim "obviously an endorsement of the doctrine of White
Supremacy").
33 See Loving, 388 U.S. at 3 (quoting the trial judge: "Almighty God created the races white,
black, yellow, malay and red, and he placed them on separate continents. And but for the in-
terference with his arrangement there would be no cause for such marriages. The fact that he
separated the races shows that he did not intend for the races to mix").
34 See id. at 11 ("There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious
racial discrimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only in-
terracial marriage involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications must stand
on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Supremacy.").
5 Id at -q
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Then again, one might think the same of the clearest defect in the
equal application defense: the failure of the statutes to apply equally
to all racial groups. Although a focus on whites and blacks was sensi-
ble considering the generally low numbers of other racial minori-
ties; 36 anti-miscegenation statutes often featured exceptions and ex-
tensions for such contingents. The statute in Perez forbade whites
from marrying "negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race or
mulattoes. '' 7 Other statutes distinguished negroes or "those of Afri-
can descent" from everyone else:8 Just as relatively low populations
helped explain the preoccupation with the white-black paradigm, it
was the presence of low but nonetheless appreciable communities
that prompted these modifications. These issues were considered
precisely because they had some relevance. In Jackson v. City of Den-
ver, Judge Burke's discussion of the race and customs of Mexicans re-
flected the presence of Mexicans in Colorado in 1942. 9 When the
Montana Supreme Court discussed Japanese intermarrying, its atten-
tion to the local Japanese community was not a coincidence. Vir-
ginia's statutory exception for "persons who have one-sixteenth or
less of the blood of the American Indian and have no other non-
Caucasic blood" was apparently intended "to recognize as an integral




For now, it suffices to recount that the equal application defense
in the miscegenation cases was extended to a variety of statutory
forms before its rejection in McLaughlin and again in Loving. These
statutes did not all define Negroes or people of African descent the
same way, yet all were deemed sufficiently equal in application.
. See U.S. Census Bureau, Census of Population and Housing: 1950 Census, available at
http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1950.htm (comparing minority popula-
tions). But see In reTakahashi's Estate, 129 P.2d 217 (Mont. 1942) (addressing Japanese popula-
tions);Jackson v. City of Denver, 124 P.2d 240 (Colo. 1942) (addressing Mexican populations).
37 Perez v. Lippold, 198 P.2d 17, 18 (Cal. 1948) (quoting CAL. Civ. CODE § 60 (1933)).
38 See, e.g., Eggers v. Olson, 231 P. 483, 484 (Okla. 1924) (quoting OKLA. COMP. STAT. § 7499
(1921)).
39 See Jackson, 124 P.2d at 241 (Burke, J.) (discussing a statute that specifically excluded the
portion of Colorado acquired from Mexico).
40 See In re Takahashi's Estate, 129 P.2d at 217 (denying a white woman the right to adminis-
ter her dead husband's estate because he was Japanese and a marriage between a white person
and a Japanese person is void in Montana); see also In re Paquet's Estate, 200 P. 911, 913 (Or.
1921) (reviewing an Oregon statute prohibiting marriage between a white person and a "Negro,
Chinese, or any person having one-fourth or more negro, Chinese, or Kanaka blood, or any
person having more than one-half Indian blood ...."). The simple claim here is that there
were Chinese and Kanaka individuals in Oregon to motivate this provision's terms.
41 VA. CODE ANN. § 20-54 (1960) (prohibiting interracial marriage and defining the term
"white persons"); see infra Part III.C (discussing the descendants of Rolfe).
Sept. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W
B. Sexing It Up: An Enticing Extension of the Equal Application Defense
Before the modern debate about same-sex marriage, the equal
application defense was extended to sex in another intriguing appli-
cation: regulations on cross-sex massage parlors. Motivated by the
need to guard against the commission of lewd acts, some states im-
posed legal restrictions on the procurement of a body massage by a
therapist of the opposite sex, often requiring the presence of a li-
censed physician.
In reviewing these statutes, the courts have been mindful, to an
extent, of their equal application betwixt the sexes. In Ex parte Maki,
a California District Court of Appeal declared a Los Angeles ordi-
nance regulating cross-sex massage permissible. 2  Maki heeds the
equal application of the ordinance to men and women alike.43 These
prohibitions are more analogous to interracial adultery, cohabitation,
and marriage prohibitions precisely because they are cross-
classification.4
Yet some attention is warranted as to the concerns these courts
saw motivating the laws at issue. Careful analysis is limited to an ex-
tent by what might be seen as prudishness; there can be only a vague
appreciation for what Judge Moore in Maki termed, "It] he inclina-
tion of a percentage of mankind to ignore conventionalities, moral
codes and inhibitory statutes and to indulge in licentious practices
42 133 P.2d 64, 69 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1943). The statute at issue reads:
a) It shall be unlawful for any person to administer, for hire or reward, to any person of
the opposite sex, any massage, any alcohol rub or similar treatment, any fomentation,
any bath, or any electric or magnetic treatment, nor shall any person cause or permit in
or about his place of business, or in connection with his business, any agent, employee or
servant or any other person under his control or supervision, to administer any such
treatment to any person of the opposite sex.
(b) This section shall not apply to any treatment administered in good faith in the
course of the practice of any healing art by any person licensed to practice any such art
or profession under the provisions of the Business and Professions Code of California or
of any other law of this state.
Id. at 66 (citations omitted). Accord People v. City of Chicago, 37 N.E.2d 929 (I1. App. Ct.
1941); Patterson v. City of Dallas, 355 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); see also Cheek v. Char-
lotte, 160 S.E.2d 21, 22 (N.C. 1968) ("In upholding the ordinance in its entirety, the Texas
court said that the case of Ex parte Maki was so well decided that it was decisive of the appeal.
The court encountered no difficulty in finding reasonable grounds for the discrimination in
favor of the persons exempted."). Cheek differed from its predecessors in rejecting the statute
for its failure to apply to other comparable businesses, without ever rejecting its distinction
drawn between the sexes. Id.
43 Maki, 133 P.2d at 67 ("The ordinance applies alike to both men and women. If petitioner
should receive only male patrons and do his own work or employ only masseurs, he would not
violate the ordinance. If he should receive only female patrons and employ only masseuses to
do his work, there would be no violation.").
" See Hernandez v. Robles, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2005) (holding that the New York
Domestic Relations Law, proscribing same-sex marriage, is constitutional under the New York
Constitution).
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arising from the sex impulse .... ,, Is "mankind" an advised term?-
Does this concern for licentiousness apply equally as to masseurs and
masseuses? Against the background of federal regulation addressing
the importation of women for immoral purposes, and not men, 4" and a
common law system that specifically designated women's rights as
subordinate, and not men's,4 7 it cannot be reasonably gainsaid that
the purpose behind the law did not apply with equal significance to
each sex.
C. Re-Marriaging the Equal Application Defense: The Contemporary Defense
In same-sex marriage cases, gay rights advocates contend that.... 48
prohibitions on same-sex marriage are a form of sex discrimination.
Traditional opponents then reply that there is no sex discrimination
because the prohibition applies equally to males and females. Justice
49Scalia's dissent in Lawrence heralded the defense's return .
In some instances, the equal application defense must be con-
ceded as impassable. Unlike the federal constitutional provisions at
issue in miscegenation laws, many same-sex marriage challenges are
brought under color of state constitutions which sometimes vary ac-
cording to their specific constitutional provisions. 5  For instance,
Indiana's state equality provision has been interpreted to demand
45 Maki, 133 P.2d at 67.
46 See, e.g., White-Slave Traffic (Mann) Act, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (1910) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (2000)) (banning the importation of females but not
males). Only in 1986 was the Mann Act amended to be gender-neutral. Child Sexual Abuse
and Pornography Act of 1986, § 5(b)(1), 100 Stat. 3510 (1986).
47 See infra notes 109-111 (discussing coverture and other marital sexual restrictions).
48 See Andrew Koppelman, Why Discrimination Against Lesbians and Gay Men Is Sex Discrimina-
lion, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 197 (1994); Andrew Koppelman, Note, The Miscegenation Analogy: Sodomy
Law as Sex Discrimination, 98 YALE L.J. 145 (1988); see also Lawrence v. State, 41 S.W.3d 349, 368
(Tex. App. 2001), revd, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (relating the "Alice, Bob, and Cathy" hypothetical).
Accord Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. 1993) (holding that same-sex couples denied a
marriage license could pursue their equal protection claim); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub.
Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970-75 (Mass. 2003) (Greaney, J., concurring) (discussing why mar-
riage laws prohibiting same-sex marriage unlawfully discriminate on the basis of sex); Baker v.
State, 744 A.2d 864, 906 (Vt. 1999) (Johnson,J, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ar-
guing that sex-based discrimination in marriage laws is unlawful if unrelated to a proper pur-
pose).
49 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 599-600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("On its face
§ 21.06(a) applies equally to all persons. Men and women, heterosexuals and homosexuals, are
all subject to its prohibition of deviate sexual intercourse with someone of the same sex. To be
sure, § 21.06 does distinguish between the sexes insofar as concerns the partner with whom the
sexual acts are performed: men can violate the law only with other men, and women only with
other women. But this cannot itself be a denial of equal protection, since it is precisely the
same distinction regarding partner that is drawn in state laws prohibiting marriage with some-
one of the same sex while permitting marriage with someone of the opposite sex.").
5, See, e.g., Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (offering only a limited
review of federal case law).
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equal application.* Here, at least, the power of the equal application
defense cannot be reasonably resisted.
Yet many other states have fairly typical equality provisions52 and
sometimes specifically "track" their federal analog.5 Consider the
New York case of Hernandez v. Robles,54 in which the concurring opin-
ion in the Appellate Division discussed the defense at great length.
The claim of sex discrimination in Robles came to the Appellate Divi-
sion in a precarious posture. Judge Doris Ling-Cohan had deter-
mined that the statute impermissibly discriminated on the basis of
sexual orientation, without deciding whether it discriminated on the
basis of sex.56 Judge Catterson took issue. First, he asserted the same
51 Id. at 37 ("First, the disparate treatment accorded by the legislation must be reasonably
related to inherent characteristics which distinguish the unequally treated classes. Second, the
preferential treatment must be uniformly applicable and equally available to all persons simi-
larly situated. Finally, in determining whether a statute complies with or violates Section 23,
courts must exercise substantial deference to legislative discretion." (quoting Collins v. Day, 644
N.E.2d 72, 80 (Ind. 1994))). Sadler is elsewhere clear that the Indiana Constitution differs from
state counterparts. Id. at 27; see also id. at 36 (Friedlander, J., concurring) ("A number of our
sister states either already have considered or are currently considering this question. Many
have rendered opinions. Were all state constitutions the same, such cases might be of consider-
able persuasive value. All state constitutions are not the same, however."). I excuse also in this
category Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 271 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) ("[O]ur courts em-
ploy a balancing test that considers 'the nature of the affected right, the extent to which the
governmental restriction intrudes upon it, and the public need for the restriction."'); id. at 288
(Collester, J., dissenting) ("[Olur Supreme Court has eschewed the multi-tiered analysis em-
ployed by the United States Supreme Court."); id. (citing Matthews v. City of Atlantic City, 417
A.2d 1011, 1023 (NJ. 1980) (Clifford, J., dissenting), for the description of the federal stan-
dards as a "veil of tiers").
52 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. art. CVI, § 2 ("Equality under the law shall not be denied or
abridged because of sex, race, color, creed or national origin."); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § II ("No
person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws of this state or any subdivision thereof.
No person shall, because of race, color, creed or religion, be subjected to any discrimination in
his or her civil rights by any other person or by any firm, corporation, or institution, or by the
state or any agency or subdivision of the state.").
53 See, e.g., Empress Adult Video & Bookstore v. City of Tucson, 59 P.3d 814, 828 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2002); Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 959 ("The Massachusetts Constitution protects matters of
personal liberty against government incursion as zealously, and often more so, than does the
Federal Constitution, even where both Constitutions employ essentially the same language.");
Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136, 142 (App. Div. 2006) ("The Court of
Appeals has noted that 'the State constitutional equal protection clause ... is no broader in
coverage than the Federal provision.'" (quoting Under 21 v. City of New York, 482 N.E.2d 1, 7
n.6 (N.Y. 1985))).
5 805 N.Y.S.2d 354 (App. Div. 2005).
55 Id. at 363 (Catterson, J., concurring). The majority's analysis of the sex discrimination
claim and the equal application defense is far more limited. Id. at 360 (majority opinion)
("[Plaintiffs] concede that the [Domestic Relations Law ("DRL")] marriage provisions do not
discriminate on the basis of gender; the DRL treats the members of both genders exactly the
same in terms of whom they may marry"). Judge Catterson's concurrence is unique, even
among the various same-sex marriage cases, for its lengthy exegetical treatment of the equal
application defense. Id. at 368-71 (discussing equal application).
See Hernandez v. Robles, 794 N.Y.S.2d 579, 604 (Sup. Ct. 2005), rev'd, 805 N.Y.S.2d 354
(App. Div. 2005) ("This Court, however, need not decide whether the exclusion of same-sex
couples from the institution of civil marriage discriminates against each of the persons in those
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basic argument presented in Pace but adapted to sex classifications. 57
He then, not unlike the dissent in Perez, exhaustively recounted
agreeing authorities for practically identical propositions. s Next, as
had Justice Scalia in Lawrence, Judge Catterson took to distinguishing
Loving as having "clearly stigmatized African Americans as inferior to
Caucasians" whereas he found "no evidence" of an "intent to dis-
criminate against either men or women. 5 9  But he deviated from
Scalia's dissent with assertions of his own. For one, he found it "dis-
ingenuous" to "consider the horror of the Civil War and the majesty
of the Emancipation Proclamation in the same breath as same-sex un-
ions." 6 Second, Judge Catterson advanced a "purely logical" failure
of the sex discrimination argument: that miscegenation statutes pro-
hibited marriages between individuals of different races whereas same-
sex marriage prohibitions prohibit marriages between individuals of
the same sex.6 ' The concurrence even extended the argument to the
sexual orientation discrimination claim, asserting that both homo-
sexuals and heterosexuals are free to marry individuals of the oppo-
site sex. 62 Here, too, Judge Catterson denied a discriminatory pur-
pose or intent.
Ironically, whereas miscegenation fostered no illusions of facial
neutrality outside the white-black binary, despite being so often dis-
cussed as neutral, marriage makes no reference to sex until actively
defined in these terms by the judiciary) 4 Only in Defense of Mar-
couples on the basis of sex. The exclusion of plaintiffs from entering into civil marriage indis-
pntably discriminates against them on the basis of sexual orientation.").
See Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (Catterson,J., concurring) ("It is beyond cavil that both
men and women may marry persons of the opposite sex; neither may marry anyone of the same
sex. Thus, there is no discrimination on account of sex.").
'8 See id. at 367 n.1 (discussing cases in support of the presumption that marriage can exist
only between a man and a woman).
'9 Id. at 373.
I0 d. Never mind the century between the Emancipation Proclamation and McLaughlin.
61 Id. at 373.
62 See id. (explaining that homosexuals also were permitted to marry members of the oppo-
site sex); see also Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 975 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J.,
dissenting) ("All individuals, with certain exceptions not relevant here, are free to marry.
Whether an individual chooses not to marry because of sexual orientation or any other reason
should be of no concern to the court.").
Though not the purpose of this piece, this extension draws attention to the myopic perspec-
tive of the equal application defense. If only on an empirical level, is there any doubt, given
that more homosexuals than heterosexuals would be inclined to marry someone of the same
sex, that the effect or implementation of this equal application is manifestly disproportionate
and unequal?
61 See Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 373 (Catterson,J., concurring) ("Plaintiffs have not proved,
or even alleged, that the marriage statutes were enacted with the purpose or intent to discrimi-
nate against homosexuals.").
See Samuels v. N.Y. State Dep't of Health, 811 N.Y.S.2d 136, 141 (App. Div. 2006) (discuss-
ing "remov[al] from 'marriage' [of] a definitional component of that institution (i.e., one
woman, one man)"); Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 869 (Vt. 1999) ("Ftrther evidence of the leg-
Sept. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL IA W
riage Act (DOMA) jurisdictions do statutes limit marriage to a man
and a woman. 6" In Robles and elsewhere, it is the courts that supply
their own definition of marriage and assert that definition in denying
same-sex marriages. Yet after this creativity, the equal application de-
fense is much the same, inventing the same conclusion and relying
on the same basic constitutional error.
D. A New Day, a Different Defense: Framing the "Fresh Form" of the Equal
Application Defense
The argument embraced in Pace is no doubt the formula for those
extended in Robles and elsewhere. The equal application defense has
adapted but remains essentially the same.
The only salient difference between the classic and contemporary
versions of the equal application defense is the secondary analysis of
arguable discriminatory purposes pursued in the defense's current
form. The original equal application defense ended the constitu-
tional inquiry; the new form only advances the claim past the ques-
tion of facial classification before considering a discriminatory pur-
pose. Of course, advocates of the equal application defense in same-
sex marriage cases invariably cannot locate any such discriminatory
66purpose.
islative assumption that marriage consists of a union of opposite genders may be found in the
consanguinity statutes ....").
Likewise, in his concurrence in Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2005) (Parillo, J., concurring), Judge Parillo points to "marriage laws under attack, which sim-
ply delineate which persons may not marry each other," and cites the NewJersey Statute, which
reads:
A man shall not marry any of his ancestors or descendants, or his sister, or the daughter
of his brother or sister, or the sister of his father or mother, whether such collateral kin-
dred be of the whole or half blood. A woman shall not marry any of her ancestors or de-
scendants, or her brother, or the son of her brother or sister, or the brother of her fa-
ther or mother, whether such collateral kindred be of the whole or half blood. A
marriage in violation of any of the foregoing provisions shall be absolutely void.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-1 (West 2007) (amended 2007). Yet the plaintiffs in Lewis were not in-
cestuous. The implication is instead, as even Judge Collester concedes, Lewis, 875 A.2d at 279
(Collester, J., dissenting), that the statute enshrines marriage as opposite-sex by its terms, pro-
hibiting men from marrying female relatives and women from marrying male relatives. I take
further Judge Collester's recognition that the argument, "circular" as it may in some sense be,
"has the advantage of simplicity." Id. at 280; see also infra Part III.B (utilizing definition theory to
assert facial classification). But see Andersen v. King County, No. 04-2-04964-4-SEA, 2004 WL
1738447, at *1 *2 (Wash. Super. Aug. 4, 2004), rev'd, 138 P.3d 963 (Wash. 2006) ("To 'marry'
means to join together in a close and permanent way. The plaintiffs' sworn statements reflect
that, within each pair, they have already made a close personal commitment to be joined to-
gether in a bond that is intended to be permanent. Thus, in a basic or linguistic sense, they are
in fact now married.").
( See, e.g., WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §§ 26.04.010, 26.04.020(1)(c) (West 2007) (restricting
marriage to opposite-sex couples).
See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("No purpose to dis-
criminate against men or women as a class can be gleaned from the Texas law, so rational-basis
review applies.").
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The common bond between these two equal application argu-
ments is their essential mantra: there is no discrimination. Nor is
this insistence ever justified analytically, except by its own repetition.
The fact that a law does not "create any disadvantage identified with
gender, as both men and women are similarly limited to marrying a
person of the opposite sex" does not prove the fact that a law "creates
no distinction between the sexes, but applies to men and women in
precisely the same way"-these are simply the same facts. 7 There is a
reductive quality-a "nuh-uh"-ness-to the equal application defense;
its expositors seem to view it as axiomatic that, since the law applies
equally, it is not discriminatory. The fresh form of the equal applica-
tion defense confronts the issue of purpose in the wake of McLaughlin
and Loving but both alike share in this essence.
III. LET AMERICA BE AMERICA AGAIN: CRITIQUING THE REFRESHED
DEFENSE
This revitalized equal application defense has no place in con-
temporary Equal Protection jurisprudence. On a superstructural
level, Equal Protection doctrine first determines whether any and
which classification system constitutes the basis of the statute and
then applies a standard for reviewing it. In locating a classification
system, the courts look to the face of the statute or non-facial indica-
tions of a discriminatory purpose, be they strong empiricai indica-
tions or the appearance of a statutory objective. A discriminatory
purpose does not require a particular subjective state of mind of leg-
islators but only "that an individual or group was treated differently
because of' a particular classification system.6 9 The courts then de-
67 Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 974 (Mass. 2003) (Spina, J., dissent-
ing).
CA See HUGHES, supra note 9 at 191 ("0, let America be America again- / The land that
never has been yet- / And yet must be-the land where evey man is free. / The land that's
mine-the poor man's, Indian's, Negro's, ME- / Who made America, / Whose sweat and
blood, whose faith and pain, / Whose hand at the foundry, whose plow in the rain, / Must
bring back our mighty dream again.").
Michael Selmi, Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86
GEo. L.J. 279, 289 (1997). Selmi explains:
The Court's intentional discrimination cases can be divided into two familiar categories:
those that involve facially discriminatory classifications and those that are facially neutral.
For facially discriminatory practices and policies, the element of intent is inferred from
the language, and the Court engages in no additional inquiry to determine whether the
statute or policy was discriminatory .... More commonly, statutes and policies chal-
lenged as discriminatory are facially neutral, and the court must infer intent from the
fact of differential treatment. This inference is generally drawn based on the accumu-
lated evidence, which is almost always circumstantial in nature.
Id. at 290. This much is also clear from Supreme Court precedents, particularly Personnel Ad-
ministrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney:
When a statute gender-neutral on its face is challenged on the ground that its effects
upon women are disproportionably adverse, a twofold inquiry is thus appropriate. The
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mand demonstration of the importance of the interests articulated in
defense of the statute and the statute's relationship to the advance-
ment of those interests. Classifications according to race, national
origin, and alienage require a compelling state interest and a closely
tailored relationship; classifications according to sex and illegitimacy
require an important state interest and a substantial relationship; all
other classifications require only a legitimate interest and a reason-
able relationship. 7° There is a burden-shifting element that is de-
pendent on the standard of scrutiny7' but the courts have also, guided
by Supreme Court precedents, shown a willingness to find the plain-
tiffs burden satisfied under the rational review standard.
This basic superstructure of Equal Protection jurisprudence is in-
valuable in assessing the equal application defense. The defense is
mistaken in its analysis of facial classification and discriminatory pur-
first question is whether the statutory classification is indeed neutral in the sense that it is
not gender based. If the classification itself, covert or overt, is not based upon gender,
the second question is whether the adverse effect reflects invidious gender-based dis-
crimination. In this second inquiry, impact provides an "important starting point," but
purposeful discrimination is "the condition that offends the Constitution."
442 U.S. 256, 274 (1979) (citations omitted). Feeney is also instructive because this exact passage
is cited by Judge Cordy in the third and final Goodridge dissent. 798 N.E.2d at 991-92 (CordyJ.,
dissenting) (claiming the Feeney court "declin[ed] to characterize veterans' preference as sex
discrimination because it applied to both male and female veterans"). The Feeney treatment is
clearly more substantial than that, however; consistent with McLaughlin and Loving in its atten-
tiveness to facial classification and purposeful discrimination despite the absences thereof in
Feeney. Feeney offers no shelter for the equal application defense.
70 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (holding that race, national ori-
gin, and alienage invoke "the most rigid scrutiny."). Sex discrimination has failed to earn strict
scrutiny, however, Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), and occupies an intermediate
standard, Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), alongside illegitimacy, Matthews v. Lucas, 427
U.S. 495 (1976) (Blackmun, J.). Everything else notionally gets rational review, though certain
groups such as the disabled, Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), and homo-
sexuals, Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), have had their rights vindicated under this re-
laxed standard (applying rational review and finding discrimination).
71 See generally Larry Alexander, Sometimes Better Boring and Correct: Romer v. Evans as an Exer-
cise of Ordinary Equal Protection Analysis, 68 U. COLO. L. REv. 335, 344-45 (1997) ("Strict scrutiny
on this conception is just a strong judicial presumption that rules with certain characteristics
violate the Constitution. Likewise, rational basis review represents a strong judicial presump-
tion in favor of the constitutionality of the rules to which it applies. (Actually, as the Supreme
Court has used it, rational basis review is a range of presumptions that extends from an almost
conclusive presumption of constitutionality to no presumption in favor of or against constitu-
tionality.) Intermediate scrutiny typically covers a range from some presumption of unconstitu-
tionality to no presumption of either constitutionality or unconstitutionality.").
72 See, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S 620 (1996) (holding that a Colorado constitutional
amendment prohibiting legislative, executive, and judicial action protecting homosexuals did
not bear a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose); Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 435
(applying rational review and holding a city ordinance invalid); see also Alexander, supra note 71
(discussing judicial application of rational review in equal protection case analysis); R. Randall
Kelso, Standards of Review Under The Equal Protection Clause and Related Constitutional Doctrines Pro-
tecting Individual Rights: The "Base Plus Six" Model and Modern Supreme Court Practice, 4 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 225, 227-37 (2002) (discussing Supreme Court cases striking down legislation
through application of rational review).
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pose. Additionally, the sequence of equal protection analysis coun-
sels for applying the equal application defense universally or not at
all. This "strong" critique of the equal application defense precedes
the arguments concerning facial classification and discriminatory
purpose but any of them are sufficient to defeat the defense.
A. The Strong Equal Application Defense to the Equal Application Defense
This important difference recounted above does not disturb the
ultimate formal equation of these versions. The issue(s) surveyed are
the existence of facial classifications and, in the latter version, the ex-
istence of a discriminatory purpose. These are the determinants for
the constitutional standard of scrutiny for reviewing the statute at
hand. 7 They are therefore not determined by it. There is simply no
reason why the defense should be generally good for some scruti-
nized classifications and generally not for others. To apply this
equally, there is simply no reason why the defense should be repudi-
ated by the United States Supreme Court for some classifications but
revitalized for others by courts below.
B. Facial Classification in an Anti-Affirmative Action Era
Beyond this strong attack, there are weaker claims still forceful
enough to defeat the defense. The enduring assertion of the equal
application defense is that equal application erases the burden of a
facial classification. This argument was legally wrong the day
McLaughlin was decided 4 It is even less sensible in contemporary
constitutional jurisprudence, however, where it appears that even
statutory classifications that accord benefits or preferences are un-
constitutional.
The basic error of the modern form of the equal application de-
fense is that it distorts McLaughlin and Loving on the issue of facial
classification. While it is indubitable that a discriminatory purpose
will doom a facially neutral law,7 ' McLaughlin and Loving alike re-
jected the assertion that the laws were facially neutral simply because
they applied equally. The existence of a facial classification is such an
elementary issue that no law confines it: facial classifications admit-
73 See supra note 70 (reviewing tiered scrutiny).
74 McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964).
75 SeeYick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886) ("And while this consent of the supervi-
sors is withheld from them and from two hundred ... Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chi-
nese subjects, are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions.... No rea-
son for it is shown, and the conclusion cannot be resisted, that no reason for it exists except
hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the
law is notjustified.").
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tedly involve 'judgment calls. 76 But if it is a contest between unprov-
able assertions, it does rather matter that one contestant is obligated
to adhere to the other's opinion. It is difficult to reconcile the de-
fense's view of these cases with their actual language.
In a sense, this is to say that facial classification alone is sufficient to
warrant whatever scrutiny attaches to the classification system. This is
the more consistent reading of these precedents and is on even
firmer constitutional ground in the wake of the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts' affirmative action jurisprudence. Whereas the
Court had suggested an intermediate standard of scrutiny for benign
discrimination, the Michigan Cases have clarified the extension of
strict scrutiny to such laws.'° This extension is significant, depending
perhaps on one's impression of "ox-goring."7 9 It may be that strict
scrutiny is appropriate because of a harm associated with a tradition-
ally empowered group, s° because of the illusory or paternal benefit
offered the marginalized group,"' or perhaps both. 2 It is difficult to
76 See Winkfield F. Twyman, Jr., justice Scalia and Facial Discrimination: Some Notes on Legal Rea-
soning, 18 VA. TAX REV. 103, 114 (1998) ("Because the Court is operating without textual guid-
ance or clear original meaning, every definitional issue necessarily involves a judgment call by
the Court.").
77 See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Actions de-
signed to burden groups long denied full citizenship stature are not sensibly ranked with meas-
tires taken to hasten the day when entrenched discrimination and its aftereffects have been ex-
tirpated."); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 359-62 (1978) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (applying intermediate scrutiny); see
also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (Burger, C.J.). Fullilove does not hinge on an
issue of scrutiny per se but does lend effect to the determinations of Congress, rejecting "the
contention that in the remedial context the Congress must act in a wholly 'color-blind' fash-
ion." Id. at 482. Fullilove thus shares in the lax jurisprudential attitude towards benign dis-
crimination that occupied the closing stanzas of the Burger Court.
78 See Gratz, 539 U.S. at 270-76 (2003) (invalidating an undergraduate admissions policy that
relied on racial classifications through application of strict-scrutiny equal protection analysis);
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (explaining that all racial classifications imposed by
government should be analyzed under strict scrutiny) [hereinafter, collectively, "the Michigan
Cases"].
79 "Ox-goring" has caught on as constitutional terminology for the issue. See Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 295 n.35 ("'[D]iscrimination on the basis of race is illegal, immoral, unconstitutional, inher-
ently wrong, and destructive of democratic society. Now this is to be unlearned and we are told
that this is not a matter of fundamental principle but only a matter of whose ox is gored.'"
(quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 133 (1975))).
Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 241 n.* (1995) (Thomas,J., concurring) ("It
should be obvious that every racial classification helps, in a narrow sense, some races and hurts
others."). But see Bakke, 438 U.S. at 375 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment in part and
dissenting in part) ("Unlike discrimination against racial minorities, the use of racial prefer-
ences for remedial purposes does not inflict a pervasive injury upon individual whites in the
sense that wherever they go or whatever they do there is a significant likelihood that they will be
treated as second-class citizens because of their color.").
81 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 360 (Brennan,J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part) ("[W]e nonetheless have recognized that the line between honest and thoughtful ap-
praisal of the effects of past discrimination and paternalistic stereotyping is not so clear ....
State programs designed ostensibly to ameliorate the effects of past racial discrimination obvi-
ously create the same hazard of stigma, since they may promote racial separatism and reinforce
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do one without the other: preferring one often translates into harm-
ing another. Yet it would be difficult to divorce the jurisprudence
from a rejection of preference. Some opinions have spoken specifically
83about the hazards of constitutional preferences. Moreover, the sug-
gestion of intermediate scrutiny for supposedly "benign" instances of
discrimination must generate some presumption that the lens of
preference was a considered aspect of these decisions.
8 4
the views of those who believe that members of racial minorities are inherently incapable of
succeeding on their own."). But see id. at 376 ("Once admitted, these student must satisfy the
same degree requirements as regularly admitted students; they are taught by the same faculty in
the same classes; and their performance is evaluated by the same standards by which regularly
admitted students are judged .... Since minority graduates cannot justifiably be regarded as
less well qualified than nonminority graduates by virtue of the special admissions program,
there is no reasonable basis to conclude that minority graduates at schools using such programs
would be stigmatized as inferior by the existence of such programs.").
82 See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 349-51 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ar-
guing that the policy in question amounted to both discrimination of an empowered racial
group and an unnecessary paternal aid to the aided racial group); id. at 371 ("Putting aside
what I take to be the Court's implicit rejection of Adarand's holding that beneficial and burden-
some racial classifications are equally invalid, I must contest the notion that the Law School's
discrimination benefits those admitted as a result of it."); Adarand, 515 U.S. at 241 (ThomasJ.,
concurring) ("So-called 'benign' discrimination teaches many that because of chronic and ap-
parently immutable handicaps, minorities cannot compete with them without their patronizing
indulgence. Inevitably, such programs engender attitudes of superiority or, alternatively, pro-
voke resentment among those who believe that they have been wronged by the government's
use of race. These programs stamp minorities with a badge of inferiority and may cause them
to develop dependencies or to adopt an attitude that they are 'entitled' to preferences.").
83 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 298 (Powell, J.) ("[T] here are serious problems of justice connected
with the idea of preference itself."); id. at 307 ("If petitioner's purpose is to assure within its
student body some specified percentage of a particular group merely because of its race or eth-
nic origin, such a preferential purpose must be rejected not as insubstantial but as facially inva-
lid. Preferring members of any one group for no reason other than race or ethnic origin is dis-
crimination for its own sake. This the Constitution forbids.").
84 It was, after all, racial preferences in admissions processes at issue in the Michigan Cases.
See Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 249 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.); id. at 266, n.16 (framing the
challenge as attacking "any use of race"); id. at 269-72 (recounting jurisprudence); id. at 281
(Thomas, J., concurring) ("I would hold that a State's use of racial discrimination in higher
education admissions is categorically prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause.").
The dissents in Gratz are sharply critical of the majority on the issue of standing, focusing
closely on the framing of the controversy as "any use of race." See id. at 287-88 (Stevens, J., dis-
senting) (noting Grutter's counsel's oral argument representation that, "[w]e are not suggest-
ing an absolute rule forbidding any use of race under any circumstances. What we are arguing
is that the interest asserted here by the University, this amorphous, ill-defined, unlimited inter-
est in diversity is not a compelling interest."); id. at 291-93 (Souter, J., dissenting) (criticizing
the Court's standing theory). These dissenters do not dispute, however, that the issue is race-
consciousness. See id. at 293 (describing the admissions policy at issue as a "race-conscious ad-
missions scheme"); id. at 298 (GinsburgJ., dissenting) ("[T]he Court once again maintains that
the same standard of review controls judicial inspection of all official race classifications."); id.
at 302 ("The mere assertion of a laudable governmental purpose, of course, should not immu-
nize a race-conscious measure from careful judicial inspection."). Accord Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326
(O'Connor, J.) ("Because the Fourteenth Amendment 'protects persons, not groups,' all 'gov-
ernmental action based on race-a group classification long recognized as in most circum-
stances irrelevant and therefore prohibited-should be subjected to detailed judicial inquiry to
ensure that the personal right to equal protection of the laws has not been infringed.'" (quoting
Sept. 2007]
JOURNAL OF CONSTITlTUIONAL LA W
There is certainly a strong suggestion that preferential classifica-
tions are just as constitutionally problematic as their harmful coun-
terparts. So it must be asked: if facial classifications that harm are
unconstitutional and facial classifications that benefit are unconstitu-
tional, why are facial classifications that apply equally uniquely consti-
tutional? The simple answer: they are not. Consider lastly the pur-
poses evinced for the cross-sex massage prohibitions in Maki. If facial
classification adduces an inference of a loosely defined discriminatory
intent, would not the facial neutrality of a statute yield to differential
purposes?
This critique should also dispense with the "purely logical" flaw in
the analogy found by Judge Catterson in Hernandez v. Robles.85 The
Court's jurisprudence suggests an equivalence between penalizing
one group and preferring another, yet this translation stymies the
logic of the asserted flaw. If both penalties and preferences are un-
constitutional, and preferring difference is as presumptively unconsti-
tutional as penalizing similarity,8 6 then it follows that penalizing simi-
larity is unconstitutional too.
Like the strong form of the equal application defense to the equal
application defense, this much is sufficient to return the defense to
constitutional retirement. If this is true, the question is not whether a
law without a facial classification could still possess a discriminatory
purpose, 87 but only whether any such finding of purpose is even nec-
essary after a law is found to possess a facial classification. So much
has never been held by the Court, seems contrary to the affirmative
action jurisprudence," and seems patently needless as a matter of ju-
dicial discretion.89
Adarand 515 U.S. at 227)); id. ("We have held that all racial classifications imposed by govern-
ment 'must be analyzed by a reviewing court under strict scrutiny.'" (quoting Adarand, 515 U.S.
at 227)); id. at 348 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (framing the issue as preference).
85 805 N.Y.S.2d 354, 370-71 (App. Div. 2005) (Catterson,J., concurring) ("The Loving anal-
ogy is inapt on purely logical grounds. The statutes struck down in Loving (as well as those in
Perez) prohibited marriages between members of different races, not between members of the
same race. The equivalent, in the area of sex, of an anti-miscegenation statute would not be a
statute prohibiting same-sex marriages, but one prohibiting opposite-sex marriages, an absurdity
which no State has ever contemplated.").
86 This is a cautious assertion. The rather explicit holding of the Michigan Cases is that diver-
sity may serve as a compelling interest. In this sense, "preferring difference" has been vindi-
cated. Yet, a point certainly worth stressing is that in this instance there nonetheless was a pre-
sumption of unconstitutionality salvaged only through the application of strict scrutiny.
Hernandez, 805 N.Y.S.2d at 371 (Catterson, J., concurring) (recognizing "a fundamental
precept of constitutional law that '[a] racially discriminatory purpose is always sufficient to sub-
ject a law to strict scrutiny, even a facially neutral law that makes no mention of race.'" (quoting
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003))).
88 See supra notes 77-84.
89 With all reverence for the courts, judicial discretion is not and should not be unbounded.
Rigorous nomination and election processes are likely to eliminate forcefully biased judges.
Even the most non-discriminatory judge should recognize, however, the clear danger involved
in permitting judges to excuse facial classifications based simply on a discretionary determina-
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C. The Red Rolfes and a Radical Feminist Critique of Marriage
The second prong of the contemporary equal aplication defense
is that a discriminatory purpose is likewise absent."" Even doubting
the strong defense and resisting the existence of facial classifications,
the claim of a discriminatory sexist purpose behind same-sex mar-
riage prohibitions cannot reasonably be casually dismissed. Whatever
one might think of their own marital or intimate bond, however un-
comfortable personal relationships might make this consideration, it
is undeniable that marriage and heterosexual intercourse have both
historically instantiated male social dominance. Here, Virginia's anti-
miscegenation statutory exceptions are quite instructive.
Individuals who were one-sixteenth or less Native American fared
differently under Virginia's statute than other racial minorities. In
terms of permissible marital partners, this segment of the population
technically fared better than any other racial group under the stat-
ute's terms. 9 Yet it could not plausibly be maintained that this ex-
ception marked the adoption of a racial hierarchy with this particular
group at its peak. To the contrary, exceptions such as Virginia's be-
speak an assimilationist ideology that is drastically different than, but
consistently racist with, the segregationist vision that dominated the
statute's application in the black-white binary. The exception for
"Red Rolfes" 92 demonstrates that race was a sufficiently malleable
value to justify the segregation and subordination of blacks for their
labor and the compelled socialization of Natives for their land.
93
Race is ubiquitous in American history and its influence long-
preceded the creation of the United States.
Yet the same should be said about the import of sex. It also oper-
ates throughout society, differently in different contexts: masculinity
94 9and femininity, gender at home and in the workplace,95 in matters
tion that the purpose was not discriminatory and regardless of any importance of the interest
the found or the statute's relation thereto.
9 See supra Part II.C (discussing same-sex marriage).
There is no provision in the Virginia statute defining these white/Native American ances-
tors as white, for the purposes of the statute or otherwise. The provision simply states these in-
dividuals may marry whites. It therefore appears that these individuals, uniquely, could marry
both white and non-white people alike.
92 This phrase refers to a term used to describe the descendents of Pocahontas and John
Rolfe. See Powhatan Ranape Nation, The Pocahontas Myth, http://www.powhatan.org/pocc.html
(defining the term and suggesting that Pocanhontas's marriage to Rolfe was less than consen-
sual).
93 This is a callous comparison, not intended to be exhaustive. Yet if it is clear that the civili-
zation of Native Americans was central to the justification for acquiring their land and equally
clear that the degradation of Negroes was central to the justification for exploiting their labor,
it hardly seems unfair to credit the difference between land and labor motives for the assimila-
tionist and segregationist demands placed on the groups.
94 See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Central Mistake of Sex Discrimination Law: The Disaggrega-
tion of Sex from Gender, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 75-99 (1995) (discussing why equality jurisprudence
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of religion 96-and in race, as well.9 7 The fact that the interaction was
between a white man and a Native American woman can partly be at-
tributed to the gendering of roles in the two cultures; the former
kept women in domestic and private capacities while the latter al-
lowed Pocahontas to serve as an active diplomat and liaison. 98 But
the legacy of Pocahontas and the apparent nobility credited in the
Virginia statute, cannot simply be attributed to the important public
functions of the Powhatan princess. The transmission of Western cul-
ture to native people through sex featured men as the active ingredi-
ent in both processes.9 The reaction of colonial explorers to a
Southwestern native ritual where women danced violently and lewdly
on "the corpses of enemies" is just one vivid example of how offensive
should not separate gender and sex); Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gen-
der, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 187, 188-96 (1988) (discussing homosexuality's departure from tradi-
tional gender norms and postulating that negative legal attitudes toward homosexuality are at-
tempts to preserve traditional views of masculinity and femininity).
95 Of course, the literature on both gender in the workplace and within the family is abun-
dant. See Zachary A. Kramer, Exclusionary Equality and the Case for Same-Sex Families: A Reworking
of Martha Fineman's Re-Visioned Family Law, 2 SEATTLE J. Soc. JUST. 505 (2004); Zachary A.
Kramer, Note, The Ultimate Gender Stereotype: Equalizing Gender-Conforming and Gender-
Nonconforming Homosexuals Under Title VII, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 465 (2004).
96 See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, Race, Religion, Gender and Interstate Federalism: Somes Notes from
History, 16 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 19, 23-24 (1996) (discussing the historical impact of religion on
issues such as slavery and polygamy); Elizabeth M. Iglesias & Francisco Valdes, Afterword, Relig-
ion, Gender, Sexuality, Race and Class in Coalitional Theory: A Critical and Self-Critical Analysis of Lat-
Crit Social Justice Agendas, 19 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 503, 548-51 (1998) (addressing the inter-
play between religion and dissident sexuality).
97 This intersection has been most ably explored by Professors Kimberle Crenshaw and An-
gela Harris. See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: lntersectionality, Identity Poli-
tics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991); Angela P. Harris, Race and
Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990).
98 See DAVID A. PRICE, LOVE AND HATE IN JAMESTOWN 153 (2003) (describing Pocahontas's
.strong-willed spirit" when confronting the foreign colonists).
99 See Hilary Charlesworth, Christine Chinkin & Shelley Wright, Feminist Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, 85 AM.J. INT'L L. 613, 621-34 (1991) (highlighting the dominance of the masculine
over the feminine in analysis of international law); A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K.
Kopytoff, Racial Purity and Interracial Sex in the Law of Colonial and Antebellum Virginia, 77 GEO.
L.J. 1967, 1977 (1989) (providing distinct legal treatment in colonial Virginia of children of
native and non-native parents); Kunal M. Parker, The "Law"/"Politics" Distinction in the Colo-
nial/Postcolonial Context, 10 AM. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 581, 583 (2002) (describing the
combination of the male-dominated, western material world and the feminine, indigenous
spiritual domain); see also CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 5 (1987) (noting
the violence historically inflicted by men on women through sex). Here, Tennessee's Lonas v.
State is telling in its rendition of the equal application defense:
[Negroes] have the same right to make and enforce contracts with whites that whites
have with them, but no rights as to the white race which the white race is denied as to the
black. The same rights to contract with each other that the white have with each other;
the same to contract with the whites that the whites have with the blacks, but not a supe-
rior right of a negro to marry a white woman, when a white man can not marry a negro.
If the males of one race had the right to appropriate the females of the other, while that
right was denied to the males of the other race, there might be some foundation for the
charge of discrimination.
50 Tenn. 287, 300 (1871).
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an inversion of sexual activity and passivity was to the cultural sensi-
bilities of the Westerners. 00
Sex instantiated power in a different but appreciable way within
the white-black binary before and after the abolition of slavery. Dis-
putes persist as to the prevalence of breeding techniques per se, but
the use of the black woman's reproductive capability to perpetuate
the slave trade is undeniable, particularly after the importation of
slaves was prohibited.'0 ' There is too much historical support indicat-
ing the prevalence of sexual relations between white male slaveown-
ers and their black female slaves to be ignored or dismissed as anec-
dotal or rare, and, considering that the rape of a slave was generally
not a criminal offense, there is every reason to scrutinize these rela-
tionships. 0 2 These problems suggest the tremendous burden placed
on black women during slavery. More generally, they vividly depict
how sex, marriage, and reproductivity can be used to reify power.
When a black peon recounts his wife's liaisons with one of the white
owners, her staying in a separate, nicer house with her children from
the owner, the sale of his own son with her and an owner's eventual
decision to simply tell him to "it," the illustration of power through
sex and reproductivity is clear. When a slaveowner's black mistress
raised "her" children in separate and more comfortable quarters, one
cannot ignore the dominance that permitted those comforts.
The terrors of rape and lynching remained common tactics in the
racial and sexual regulation of the freed slaves throughout segrega-
tion. 04 Reconstruction brought new perils as well, however. In Kill-
100 WILLIAM K. POWERS, WAR DANCE: PLAINS INDIAN MUSICAL PERFORMANCE (1990). See
MACKINNON, supra note 99, at 89 (opining that "[w]hat is not considered to be a hierarchy is
women and men-men on top and women on the bottom"). Of course, Gayle Rubin's classic
Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER:
EXPLORING FEMALE SEXUALITY 267-319 (Carole S. Vance ed., 1984), also recognizes these at-
tributes.
101 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 ("The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of
the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress
prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on
such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person."); see also DOROTHY ROBERTS,
KILLING THE BLACK BODY 22-55 (1997) (discussing reproduction in the slave trade); id. at 27-28
(noting historical debate about the prevalence of breeding techniques).
102 See ROBERTS, supra note 101 at 29-33 (illustrating the sexual tortures endured by female
slaves).
103 See Ida B. Wells Barnett, The Lift Story of a Negro Peon, Obtained from an Interview with a Geor-
gia Negro, reprinted in BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA 150-55 (1972) (discussing the historical
role of black women as sex objects).
104 Lynching and rape were often complementary tools of oppression. Family members de-
crying the sexual violation of black women were met with the lynching party, and lynching par-
ties frequently violated black women while looking for their family members. See Barnett, supra
note 103, at 202 ("With the Southern white man, any mesalliance existing between a white
woman and a colored man is a sufficient foundation for the charge of rape .... In numerous
instances where colored men have been lynched on the charge of rape, it was positively known
at the time of lynching, and indisputably proven after the victim's death, that the relationship
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ing the Black Body, Dorothy Roberts powerfully argues that modern
reproductive policy, particularly as evinced by political debates sur-
rounding welfare recipients, cannot be divorced from America's rac-
ist heritage. 0 5 En route, she notes how eugenic theory lent justifica-
tion to the racist ideology of slavery and resulted in the augmenting
of anti-miscegenation laws. In these issues, Roberts finds the asser-
tion of both racial and sexual power. Her thrust in Killing the Black
Body is the racialization of reproductive policy, whereas the thrust of
this work is the sexualization of racial and colonial policy. In Poca-
hantas, children are taught the story of a Powhatan princess who is
taken, racially and sexually, by white civilization-and taught to laud
it.
Relations of power between white men and Native American and
black women are particular illustrations of relations of power be-
tween men and women generally. Indeed, the rape of women is an
enduring tool of political power, intraracially, interracially and inter-
nationally alike. 1° It may be, as some feminist commentators have
claimed, that heterosexual sex is power. l 7 It suffices to say simply
that sex so often in America's cultural tradition has been power and
sustained between the man and the woman was voluntary and clandestine, and that in no court
of law could even the charge of assault have been successfully maintained."); id. at 207 ("[I]t is a
great mistake to suppose that rape is the real cause of lynching in the South."); see also Defend
Black Women-And Die! The Lynching of Berry Washington, ATLANTA CONST., July 25, 1919, re-
printed in BLACK WOMEN IN WHITE AMERICA, supra note 103 (exploring lynching in retaliation
against the protection of young black women against sexual violence).
105 See ROBERTS, supra note 101, at 203-08 (illuminating the racist roots of welfare policy).
106 See ERIC W. RISE, THE MARTINSVILLE SEVEN: RACE, RAPE, AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 7-24
(1995) (describing the events surrounding the rape of a white woman by a group of young
black men); Barbara Holden-Smith, Inherently Unequal Justice: Interracial Rape and the Death Pen-
alty, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1571, 1571 (1996) (claiming that the accusation of black
men for the rape of white women was a defining characteristic of race relations in the South);
see also Arden B. Levy, International Prosecution of Rape in Warfare: Nondiscriminatory Recognition
and Enforcement, 4 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 255, 256 (1994) (discussing the lack of appropriate at-
tention to rape in the international law context); Theodor Meron, Comment, Rape as a Crime
Under International Humanitarian Law, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 424, 425 (1993) (focusing on the preva-
lence of rape in the former Yugoslavia).
107 See MACKINNON supra note 99, at 6 ("All the ways in which women are suppressed and sub-
jected-restricted, intruded on, violated, objectified-are recognized as what sex is for women
and as the meaning and content of femininity. If this is done, sexuality itself is no longer un-
implicated in women's second-class status. Sexual violence can no longer be categorized away
as violence not sex."); id. at 50 ("[Fleminism is a theory of how the erotization of dominance
and submission creates gender, creates woman and man in the social form in which we know
them. Thus the sex difference and the dominance-submission dynamic define each other."); id.
at 85 ("What I see to be the danger of [unifying issues of violence against women], what makes
it potentially cooptive, is formulating it-and it is formulated this way-these are issues of vio-
lence, not sex: rape is a crime of violence, not sexuality; sexual harassment is an abuse of power,
not sexuality; pornography is violence against women, it is not erotic."); id. at 86-87 ("What we
are saying is that sexuality in exactly these normal forms often does violate us. So long as we say
that those things are abuses of violence, not sex, we fail to criticize what has been made of sex,
what has been done to us through sex, because we leave the line between rape and intercourse,
sexual harassment and sex roles, pornography and eroticism, right where it is.").
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that sex often remains power today. Traditional marriage, with dow-
er and coverture"'1  and the legal inexistence of marital rape,"" can
hardly be immunized from this equation of sex and power. Social
mores have developed but there should be no mistake: even today,
"t]his is being done to real women now.
If sex and marriage have often been and may often remain the in-
stantiation of power, the insistence on opposite-sex marriage alone
clearly implicates sex discrimination. In America's cultural tradition,
legal history, and in many American households today (and thus to
many American eyes and ears), the term "wife" implies an inferior
and subordinate status.12 To reserve that status for only women, and
as women's only status, is to discriminate against them. "Gender here
is a matter of dominance, not difference."'r
The rejoinder to this radical vision of marriage and sex relations
generally is that such relations preserve natural and/or social har-
108 See, e.g., Heather Jacobson, The Marriage Dower: Essential Guarantor of Women's Rights in the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, 10 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 143, 144 (2003) (defending practice of
marriage dower in protecting Palestinian women).
19 See, e.g., Janet Calvo, A Decade of Spouse-Bosed Immigration Laws: Coverture's Diminishment but
Not Its Demise, 56 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 154, 154-55 (2003) (illustrating that the basic concepts of
coverture have been retained in spouse-related immigration laws); Emily Field Van Tessel, Re-
binding the Sticks: A Comment on Is Coverture Dead?, 82 GEO. L.J. 2291, 2293 (1994) (recharac-
terizing Joan Williams's theory as requiring the use of "dependency" in its alimony analysis);
Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. LJ. 2227, 2229 (1994)
(identifying problems with the alimony framework that views the husband's claims as rooted in
entitlement, whereas the woman's claims are linked to mere discretionary allotments).
Ito See State v. Smith, 426 A.2d 38, 39 (N.J. 1981) (providing an example where the criminal
code was reformed to exclude the defense of marriage when charged with rape); MATTHEW
HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM CORONAE: THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 629 (1800)
("[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind unto
her husband, which she cannot retract."); Smith, 426 A.2d at 41 (resisting the exemption, trac-
ing the theory to Hale "in a bare, extra-judicial declaration made some 300 years ago."); see also
MACKINNON, supra note 99, at 26 ("The reality is that not only married women, but also women
men know or live with, can be raped at will. Men know this. Rape is not illegal, it is regulated.
When a man assaults his wife, it is still seen as a domestic squabble, as permissible; when she
fights back, it is a crime."); id. at 59 ("Men define women as sexual beings; feminism compre-
hends that femininity 'is' sexual. Men see rape as intercourse; feminists say much intercourse
'is' rape.");Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CAL. L. REV.
1373, 1375 (2000) (showing that some form of the common law exemption still exists in a ma-
jority of states); Note, To Have and to Hold: The Marital Rape Exemption and the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1255 (1986) (discussing the continued use of the marital rape ex-
emption to subordinate women). But see Smith, 425 A.2d at 45 (explaining that the rule that a
husband cannot be guilty of rape upon his wife has been adopted by its sister-states and consid-
ering a due process question of whether the husband had notice that his conduct was criminal).
I MACKINNON, supra note 99, at 199.
11 See id. at 23 ("[W]omen's place is not only different but inferior,.., not chosen but en-
forced."). Thus MacKinnon's suggestion that same-sex marriage "might do something amazing
to the entire institution of marriage" by recognizing "the unity of two 'persons' between whom
no superiority or inferiority could be presumed on the basis of gender." Id. at 27.
u1 See id. at 51 (observing that men and women are equally different, yet unequally power-
ful).
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mony. Though often coupled with the wondrous common benefits
accrued under this gendered arrangement, I take the sharper edge of
this argument to be the depths lodged by it in constitutional doc-
trine. Law has not embraced radical feminism and maintains that
some sex differentiations are appropriate. Yet a reminder to those
traditionalists who are also formalists: in such instances the Court has
not simply conceded a discriminatory purpose and then summarily
excused it. Rather, the Court has subjected those laws to its interme-
diate scrutiny and upheld them only upon a showing of some sub-
stantial relationship to a significant interest." 4 In other words, this is
a much better rejoinder to a radical feminist theory of sex relations
than it is a defense of the equal application defense. Like its treat-
ment of facial classification, the defense's understanding of discrimi-
natory purpose is lacking.
D. The Critique of Conflicting Critiques
It should go without saying that the doctrinal conservative critique
and the theoretical feminist critique represent widely divergent per-
spectives that more often conflict than coincide. One might be able
to safely guess that few conservatives are likely to be so critical of the
history of marriage as a social institution and equally few feminists are
likely to be formalistic in their perspectives on affirmative action.
This chasm, though great, does not disturb or mitigate the critical
focus on the equal application defense. Facial and purposeful dis-
crimination are alternative triggers for the standards of scrutiny
drawn for various classifications. ' Either of these arguments, or the
strong defense, on its own, is sufficient to defeat the equal applica-
tion defense and trigger the requisite scrutiny. The critiques address-
ing the equal application defense's conclusions regarding the ab-
sences of facial classification and discriminatory purpose do conflict,
but that alone is no response to these critiques of the equal applica-
tion defense.
IV. CONCLUSION
No doubt this Paper will be promptly recycled by those tempted to
view it as just another same-sex marriage article. Yet this Article has
repeatedly stopped short of simply concluding that bans on same-sex
marriage are unconstitutional. Traditionalist defenders are welcome
to reformulate their defenses in the language of intermediate scru-
tiny if they want to avoid the constitutional prohibition on sex dis-
crimination. After all, to paraphrase Justice O'Connor discussing the
114 See supra note 70 (presenting the Court's intermediate scrutiny).
1I5 See id. (discussing the elements required for a stringent review by the Court).
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purpose of strict scrutiny and race, the very purpose of intermediate
scrutiny is to "smoke out" illegitimate uses of sex as a classification by
assuring that the legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough
to warrant use of a quasi-suspect tool. " When addressing such an in-
. •,•,117
veterate institution with "such profound social significance as mar-
riage, this burden of reformulation should not be too much for tradi-
tionalists to bear. If not, not; so be it. But, in any event, arguments
against same-sex marriage must actually comport with constitutional
doctrine surrounding discrimination and equality. In this most mod-
est legal obligation, the equal application defense simply fails.
116 See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (O'Connor, J.) ("In-
deed, the purpose of strict scrutiny is to 'smoke out' illegitimate uses of race by assuring that the
legislative body is pursuing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool.");
id. at 494-95 (querying how to determine whether a classification is remedial without scrutiniz-
ing the classification).
17 Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 275 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005) (Parillo,J., concurring)
(writing separately to underscore the importance of maintaining a distinction between the judi-
ciary and the legislature for such significant social issues). See id. at 276 (resisting the "distilla-
tion of marriage down to its pure 'close personal relationship'" because "the marital form tradi-
tionally has embraced so much more, including: the fundamental facets of [traditional]
conjugal life: the fact of sexual difference; the enormous tide of heterosexual desire in human
life, the massive significance of male female bonding in human life; the procreativity of hetero-
sexual bonding, the unique social ecology of heterosexual parenting which bonds children to
their biological parents, and the rich genealogical nature of heterosexual ties" (alteration in
original)). One might easily surmise from this exegesis that Judge Parillo would find this em-
brace of substantial, if not compelling, importance. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S.
371, 376 (1971) (calling marriage "of basic importance in our society").
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